Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
f93aeb97 | 1 | .\" @(#)crypt.1 6.1 (Berkeley) %G% |
c38495d9 | 2 | .\" |
f93aeb97 | 3 | .TH CRYPT 1 "" |
c38495d9 KM |
4 | .AT 3 |
5 | .SH NAME | |
6 | crypt \- encode/decode | |
7 | .SH SYNOPSIS | |
8 | .B crypt | |
9 | [ password ] | |
10 | .SH DESCRIPTION | |
11 | .I Crypt | |
12 | reads from the standard input and writes | |
13 | on the standard output. | |
14 | The | |
15 | .I password | |
16 | is a key that selects a particular transformation. | |
17 | If no | |
18 | .I password | |
19 | is given, | |
20 | .I crypt | |
21 | demands a key from the terminal and turns | |
22 | off printing while the key is being typed in. | |
23 | .I Crypt | |
24 | encrypts and decrypts with the same key: | |
25 | .PP | |
26 | crypt key <clear >cypher | |
27 | .br | |
28 | crypt key <cypher | pr | |
29 | .PP | |
30 | will print the clear. | |
31 | .PP | |
32 | Files encrypted by | |
33 | .I crypt | |
34 | are compatible with those treated by the editor | |
35 | .I ed | |
36 | in encryption mode. | |
37 | .PP | |
38 | The security of encrypted files depends on three factors: | |
39 | the fundamental method must be hard to solve; | |
40 | direct search of the key space must be infeasible; | |
41 | `sneak paths' by which keys or cleartext can become | |
42 | visible must be minimized. | |
43 | .PP | |
44 | .I Crypt | |
45 | implements a one-rotor machine designed along the lines | |
46 | of the German Enigma, but with a 256-element rotor. | |
47 | Methods of attack on such machines are known, but not widely; | |
48 | moreover the amount of work required is likely to be large. | |
49 | .PP | |
50 | The transformation of a key into the internal | |
51 | settings of the machine is deliberately designed to | |
52 | be expensive, i.e. to take a substantial fraction of | |
53 | a second to compute. | |
54 | However, | |
55 | if keys are restricted to (say) | |
56 | three lower-case letters, | |
57 | then encrypted files can be read by expending only | |
58 | a substantial fraction of | |
59 | five minutes of machine time. | |
60 | .PP | |
61 | Since the key is an argument to the | |
62 | .I crypt | |
63 | command, | |
64 | it is potentially visible to users executing | |
65 | .IR ps (1) | |
66 | or a derivative. | |
67 | To minimize this possibility, | |
68 | .I crypt | |
69 | takes care to destroy any record of the key | |
70 | immediately upon entry. | |
71 | No doubt the choice of keys and key security | |
72 | are the most vulnerable aspect of | |
73 | .I crypt. | |
74 | .SH FILES | |
75 | /dev/tty for typed key | |
76 | .SH "SEE ALSO" | |
77 | ed(1), | |
78 | makekey(8) | |
79 | .SH BUGS | |
80 | There is no warranty of merchantability nor any warranty | |
81 | of fitness for a particular purpose nor any other warranty, | |
82 | either express or implied, as to the accuracy of the | |
83 | enclosed materials or as to their suitability for any | |
84 | particular purpose. Accordingly, Bell Telephone | |
85 | Laboratories assumes no responsibility for their use by the | |
86 | recipient. Further, Bell Laboratories assumes no obligation | |
87 | to furnish any assistance of any kind whatsoever, or to | |
88 | furnish any additional information or documentation. |