Commit | Line | Data |
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4ae50aef RM |
1 | .TH CRYPT 1 |
2 | .SH NAME | |
3 | crypt \- encode/decode | |
4 | .SH SYNOPSIS | |
5 | .B crypt | |
6 | [ password ] | |
7 | .SH DESCRIPTION | |
8 | .I Crypt | |
9 | reads from the standard input and writes | |
10 | on the standard output. | |
11 | The | |
12 | .I password | |
13 | is a key that selects a particular transformation. | |
14 | If no | |
15 | .I password | |
16 | is given, | |
17 | .I crypt | |
18 | demands a key from the terminal and turns | |
19 | off printing while the key is being typed in. | |
20 | .I Crypt | |
21 | encrypts and decrypts with the same key: | |
22 | .PP | |
23 | crypt key <clear >cypher | |
24 | .br | |
25 | crypt key <cypher | pr | |
26 | .PP | |
27 | will print the clear. | |
28 | .PP | |
29 | Files encrypted by | |
30 | .I crypt | |
31 | are compatible with those treated by the editor | |
32 | .I ed | |
33 | in encryption mode. | |
34 | .PP | |
35 | The security of encrypted files depends on three factors: | |
36 | the fundamental method must be hard to solve; | |
37 | direct search of the key space must be infeasible; | |
38 | `sneak paths' by which keys or cleartext can become | |
39 | visible must be minimized. | |
40 | .PP | |
41 | .I Crypt | |
42 | implements a one-rotor machine designed along the lines | |
43 | of the German Enigma, but with a 256-element rotor. | |
44 | Methods of attack on such machines are known, but not widely; | |
45 | moreover the amount of work required is likely to be large. | |
46 | .PP | |
47 | The transformation of a key into the internal | |
48 | settings of the machine is deliberately designed to | |
49 | be expensive, i.e. to take a substantial fraction of | |
50 | a second to compute. | |
51 | However, | |
52 | if keys are restricted to (say) | |
53 | three lower-case letters, | |
54 | then encrypted files can be read by expending only | |
55 | a substantial fraction of | |
56 | five minutes of machine time. | |
57 | .PP | |
58 | Since the key is an argument to the | |
59 | .I crypt | |
60 | command, | |
61 | it is potentially visible to users executing | |
62 | .IR ps (1) | |
63 | or a derivative. | |
64 | To minimize this possibility, | |
65 | .I crypt | |
66 | takes care to destroy any record of the key | |
67 | immediately upon entry. | |
68 | No doubt the choice of keys and key security | |
69 | are the most vulnerable aspect of | |
70 | .I crypt. | |
71 | .SH FILES | |
72 | /dev/tty for typed key | |
73 | .SH "SEE ALSO" | |
74 | ed(1), | |
75 | makekey(8) | |
76 | .SH BUGS | |
77 | There is no warranty of merchantability nor any warranty | |
78 | of fitness for a particular purpose nor any other warranty, | |
79 | either express or implied, as to the accuracy of the | |
80 | enclosed materials or as to their suitability for any | |
81 | particular purpose. Accordingly, Bell Telephone | |
82 | Laboratories assumes no responsibility for their use by the | |
83 | recipient. Further, Bell Laboratories assumes no obligation | |
84 | to furnish any assistance of any kind whatsoever, or to | |
85 | furnish any additional information or documentation. |